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The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) introduced a mandate requiring chain 
restaurants to post calorie counts on menus and menu boards. This paper investigates whether and 
why calorie posting laws work.  To do so, we develop a model of calories consumed that highlights 
two potential channels through which mandates influence choice and outlines an empirical strategy 
to disentangle these alternatives.  We test the predictions of our model using data from the 
Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System to compare changes in body mass index (BMI), 
obesity, and consumer well-being in locations that implemented calorie-posting laws between 
2008 and 2011 to those in neighboring locations without such laws. We find that calorie mandates 
lead to a small but statistically significant reduction in average BMI of 0.2 kg/m2 (1.5 pounds) and 
reductions in self-reported measures of life satisfaction.  Quantile regressions provide evidence 
that reductions in BMI and life satisfaction are concentrated among those with healthy weight. 
Viewed in its totality, the pattern of results is consistent with an economic model in which calorie 
labels influence consumers both by providing information and by imposing a welfare-reducing 
moral cost on unhealthy eating.    
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I. Introduction 
The concurrent increases in restaurant meals, caloric intake, and obesity have spurred a 
literature exploring the causal link between the consumption of meals at restaurants and increases 
in obesity (e.g., Currie et al., 2010; Dunn, 2010; Anderson and Matsa, 2011; Courtemanche et al., 
2016).2  From a policy perspective, this connection raises the question of whether market failures 
are at work – a concern that is enhanced by evidence that consumers underestimate the calories 
contained in restaurant meals (e.g., Kozup et al., 2003; Burton and Creyer, 2004; CCPHA, 2007; 
Wisdom et al., 2010; Block et al., 2013).  Attempting to address such internalities and reverse 
trends in obesity, policymakers have introduced mandates that require chain restaurants to post 
calorie counts on menus and menu boards.  Such mandates are designed to “nudge” healthier food 
choice by making calories more salient at the point of purchase.   
Despite the increased prevalence of such mandates, the existing literature has focused on 
estimating their impacts on either calories consumed (e.g., Elbel et al., 2009 and 2011; Bollinger 
et al., 2011; Finkelstein et al., 2011; Auchincloss et al., 2013; Krieger et al., 2013) or BMI (e.g., 
Yelowitz, 2016; Deb and Vargas, 2016; Restrepo, 2017).  Given this focus, the existing literature 
provides little to no guidance as to the channels through which “nudges”, such as calorie mandates, 
influence choice or the associated welfare effects.  It is this gap in the literature that our study aims 
to fill.  In doing so, we seek to move the literature from studies designed to evaluate whether a 
given “nudge” works to studies designed to understand why the “nudge” works.   
We begin by developing a model of calories consumed and how this choice is impacted by 
calorie mandates.  Our model assumes that calorie choice is influenced by three considerations; (i) 
 
2 For example, Currie et al. (2010) find that having a fast food restaurant within 0.1 miles of a school results in an 
approximate 5.2 percent increase in obesity rates amongst ninth grade students.  However, Anderson and Matsa 
(2011) find that such effects are less pronounced in rural areas. 
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consumption (or experienced) utility, which depends on both calories consumed and an 
individual’s weight, (ii) an “internality” or bias that influences choice but not subsequent 
consumption utility, and (iii) psychic (or moral) costs that influences both decision and 
consumption utility.  In our model, internalities could reflect imperfect information about calorie 
counts or other sources of “bias” such as inattention, “cognitive bandwidth”, or time inconsistency 
that lead to the overconsumption of calories (e.g., Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013; Courtemanche 
et al., 2015a; Allcott et al., 2019; Sadoff et al., forthcoming).   Psychological (or moral) costs 
depend on the environment, i.e., whether one is aware of the relative calories for different menu 
items, and reflects the notion that individuals may feel guilty when selecting high calorie items.      
Our model shows that calorie mandates can influence choice through two distinct channels.  
First, by providing information on caloric content on menus and increasing the salience of healthy 
food options at the time of purchase, calorie mandates might reduce internalities and lead to 
improved choice for “biased” agents.  Second, such labels may impose a “shadow tax” on higher 
calorie items and hence distort the relative “price” of such items vis-à-vis lower calorie 
alternatives.3  Our model thus predicts that calorie mandates should cause a decrease in calories 
consumed but that the subsequent effects on the decision-maker’s welfare depend on the relative 
size of the internality foregone and the psychic costs (guilt) triggered by the presence of calorie 
labels.  Further, our model provides a way to distinguish between these channels by examining 
heterogeneity in the effects on BMI and changes in stated wellbeing. 
We use data from the 1994-2012 waves of the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System 
(BRFSS) to test the predictions of our model and uncover the channels through which calorie 
 
3 Intuitively, individuals can avoid the “shadow tax” by selecting lower calorie items.  However, if such items are 
less preferred than higher calorie alternative, the presence of calorie labels can lead to lower levels of consumption 
utility. 
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mandates impact choice.  Rather than relying on a single test to identify the channels, we analyze 
the effects of calorie mandates on multiple outcomes using the BRFSS and other secondary 
datasets, examine different subsets of the population based on our theoretical predictions, and 
weigh the totality of the evidence.4  To do so, we investigate the impacts of local and state chain 
restaurant calorie labeling mandates on BMI and overall consumer well-being, as measured by life 
satisfaction.  As the BRFSS data do not include information on calories consumed, we also 
investigate the impact of the calorie mandates on other factors that could influence BMI – smoking, 
alcohol consumption, and exercise.  Such analysis provides indirect evidence that any observed 
changes in BMI reflect changes in calories consumed and allows us to better link our theory and 
empirical findings.   
Identifying variation comes from differences in calorie-labeling mandate implementation 
and enforcement across geographic areas and over time. We provide two pieces of evidence 
highlighting the validity of our identification strategy: differences in the prevalence and awareness 
of calorie labels across treated areas with different levels of enforcement and control areas.  First, 
we summarize data from phone calls to chain restaurants showing that restaurants in treated areas 
were more likely to report listing calories on menus and menu boards than counterparts in control 
areas.  Second, we summarize survey data showing a substantial difference in the likelihood 
individuals in treated areas notice calorie labels at chain restaurants than counterparts in control 
areas. 
Turning to our econometric results, we find that calorie mandates lead to small but 
significant reductions in BMI of 0.19 kg/m2 (corresponding to about 1.5 pounds and 0.7% of the 
sample mean).  We provide evidence showing that the results are robust to concerns about policy 
 
4 In this regard, our strategy is similar to Porter and Zona (1993), who rely upon multiple tests rather than a single 
test to detect bid rigging in procurement auctions. 
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endogeneity, the construction of the control group sample, the staggered implementation of these 
laws, and the limited number of policy changes.  Interestingly, we find that the effects on BMI are 
driven entirely by those locations who actively enforced the local mandates throughout our sample 
period.  In fact, we find no effects in locations where enforcement was “weak”.  Such heterogeneity 
is consistent with differences in the likelihood that restaurants across these different locations 
report posting calories on menus and consumers living in these locations report having noticed 
calories on menus when eating out.   
We next explore the impact of the calorie mandates on compensating behaviors that could 
influence BMI independent of any change in calories consumed.  Specifically, we explore if the 
enactment of the local mandates had any impact on three compensating behaviors: (i) the 
likelihood an individual smokes, (ii) the number of alcoholic drinks consumed per month, and (iii) 
the likelihood an individual exercises along with the time spent exercising each month.  We find 
that the enactment of the local mandates had no effect on any of these metrics. Viewed in 
conjunction with the effects on BMI, such patterns suggest that the observed changes in BMI are 
driven by the presence of calorie counts and subsequent changes in calories consumed as opposed 
to other factors.   
Our theoretical model suggests that calorie labels could reduce BMI because of the 
provision of information and the presence of moral costs.  Evidence on the importance of moral 
costs comes from our analysis of life satisfaction.  Specifically, we find that the presence of calorie 
labeling mandates leads to a reduction in self-reported life satisfaction that is concentrated among 
people in the healthy weight category, as opposed to those who are overweight or obese. These 
findings are consistent with our model and suggest that calorie labels impact consumers both by 
providing information and by inflicting a welfare-reducing moral cost on unhealthy eating for 
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consumers with relatively accurate information on caloric content prior to the introduction of the 
labels. 
To further understand the importance of moral costs as a channel through which calorie 
labels influence choice, we estimate quantile regressions that allow heterogeneous response to 
local mandates across the BMI distribution.  Results from this exercise show that the calorie 
labeling laws have statistically significant effects in quantiles that correspond to BMIs in the 
healthy weight category.  That we find effects for healthy weight individuals who are unlikely 
affected by internalities provides evidence consistent with the notion of moral costs.  Even in the 
absence of new information, consumers would reduce calories consumed when faced with calorie 
labels as a way to avoid the psychic costs (or guilt) triggered by the purchase of high calorie items. 
This is a theoretical channel introduced by Jimenez-Gomez’s (2019) model of nudges that we are 
the first to explore empirically in a relevant context.  
Our paper contributes to several literatures.  First, our paper contributes to a vast body of 
work exploring how simple messages that provide consumer information about misperceived or 
shrouded attributes of a product or service impact subsequent choices.  For example, there is a 
growing body of work exploring how simple messages that educate individuals about non-linear 
tax incentives such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (Chetty and Saez, 2013) or Social Security 
benefits (Liebman and Luttmer, 2011) impact subsequent labor supply.5  A related body of work 
examines the impact of providing information on misperceived or shrouded attributes such as fuel 
efficiency (Allcott and Knittel, 2019), energy savings (Allcott and Taubinksy, 2015; Davis and 
Metcalf, 2016; Allcott and Sweeney, 2017), the benefits of school choice or post-secondary 
 
5 There is similar work in the context of environmental economics showing that educating consumers about non-
linear tariffs for electricity and the prevailing marginal prices impact subsequent patterns of consumption (Kahn and 
Wolak, 2013). 
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education (Hastings and Weinstein, 2008; Jensen, 2010; Barr and Turner, 2018), the returns to job 
search or retirement savings plans (Duflo et al., 2016; Saez, 2009; Altmann et al., 2019), restaurant 
hygiene grades (Jin and Leslie, 2003), and truth-in-lending styles disclosures (Seira et al., 2017) 
on subsequent choice.  Amongst this body of work, our study is most closely related to explorations 
of the impact of calorie labels on subsequent calories purchased and BMI (e.g., Bollinger et al., 
2011; Deb and Vargas, 2016; Restrepo, 2017).  However, our paper extends this earlier work on 
calorie mandates by developing a theoretical model and using it to identify the channels through 
which calorie labels impact choice behavior. 
Second, our paper contributes to a growing body of literature using measures of subjective 
well-being to measure the effects of government policies or other economic shocks.  For example, 
recent work has used measures of subjective well-being to place monetary value on public goods 
(or public bads) such as airport noise (Van Praag and Baarsma, 2005), flood disasters (Luechinger 
and Raschky, 2009), terrorism (Frey et al., 2009; Metcalfe et al., 2011), traffic congestion 
(Anderson et al., 2016), the Chernobyl disaster (Danzer and Danzer, 2016), and air pollution 
(Luechinger, 2009; Levinson, 2012).  A related body of work has used subjective well-being to 
evaluate the impacts of policies or economic shocks such as inflation targeting (Di Tella et al., 
2001), German re-unification (Frijters et al., 2004), creative destruction (Aghion et al., 2016), 
cigarette taxes (Gruber and Mullainathan, 2005), and the provision of improved housing for the 
poor (Galiani et al., 2018).  Our paper extends this line of inquiry by using measures of subjective 
well-being to test theory and identify the channels through which a policy impacts choice.  
The literature on behavioral welfare economics has emphasized the importance of 
heterogeneity in the population (Allcott and Taubinsky, 2015; Taubinsky and Rees-Jones, 2018; 
Allcott and Kessler, 2019) but has largely ignored the potential psychological costs (and 
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heterogeneity therein) of the nudge. One exception is Thunström (2019), who measured 
hypothetical willingness-to-pay (WTP) and emotional reactions to a calorie information nudge in 
an online experiment, and found a heterogeneous effect: those with higher self-control reacted 
more to the nudge and felt positive emotions, while those with lower self-control reacted less and 
had negative emotions.  We also find that those we identify with higher self-control (i.e., those 
with BMI in the healthy weight range) react to the nudge; however those individuals exhibit lower 
life satisfaction, implying that they suffer psychological costs (rather than having positive 
emotions from the nudge).  Our paper thus contributes by measuring the heterogeneity of the effect 
of the nudge and its psychological costs in the field.6 
Finally, our research contributes to a growing literature exploring how best to use insights 
from behavioral economics to achieve policy goals.  To date, such work has focused on areas such 
as educational attainment (Levitt et al., 2016), female labor force participation rates (Bursztyn et 
al., 2018), electricity and water conservation (Allcott, 2011; Costa and Kahn, 2013; Ferraro and 
Price, 2013; Allcott and Rogers, 2014), tax compliance (Fellner et al., 2013; Dwenger et al., 2016; 
Hallsworth et al., 2017), traffic violations (Chen et al., 2017), or the use of credit cards (Seira et 
al., 2017).7  Unlike this prior work, however, our paper goes beyond simply evaluating whether or 
not the given policy works.  We set forth to understand why the policy works and determine if the 
reason why the policy works differs across segments of the population.  In this regard, our paper 
shares similarity with work on the design of “sin” taxes (Gruber and Koszegi, 2004; Taubinsky 
 
6 In particular, we show that once calorie-information interventions are implemented in the field, psychological costs 
might exist even for those who had a positive WTP for the nudge in the lab, suggesting the importance of evaluating 
policies after implementation in the field. 
7 For an overview of work in this area, we refer the interested reader to survey articles such as Amir (2005); 
Loewenstein et al., (2007); Downs et al. (2009); Volpp et al., (2011); Matjasko et al., (2015); or Chetty (2015).   
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and Rees-Jones, 2018; Allcott et al., 2019) and efforts to “nudge” the repayment of credit card debt 
(Bursztyn et al., 2019).   
 
II. Background on Calorie Labeling Laws 
New York City became the first location in the United States to pass a chain restaurant 
calorie labeling law in 2006, which was implemented in April 2008.  Other areas across the country 
(King County, WA; Philadelphia County, PA; Albany and Schenectady County, NY; Montgomery 
County, MD; and the state of Vermont) implemented similar laws between 2009 and 2011, as 
documented in Table 1.8  The enforcement of laws passed in other locations, such as California, 
was tabled due to the passage of the ACA, as local jurisdictions anticipated the implementation 
and enforcement of the federal mandate.  Further, enforcement varied across locations with pre-
ACA mandates.  For example, while New York City, Philadelphia County, Schenectady County, 
and Montgomery County actively enforced the local mandate throughout our sample period, 
enforcement in King County, Vermont, and Albany County was either weak or varied throughout 
the sample period.9 
The first wave of studies exploring the impacts of these laws utilized receipt data and 
difference-in-difference designs to estimate the effect of calorie labels on calories ordered.10  
Treatment groups in these early studies were comprised of customers at restaurants exposed to a 
 
8 The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) introduced a national mandate requiring chain 
restaurants and retail food establishments with 20 or more locations to post calories on menus and menu boards.  
The start date of this mandate was originally set for December 2015 but was delayed until May 2018. 
9 Based on correspondence with local officials, King County actively enforced the mandate between January 2009 
and May 2010, Vermont did not actively enforce the mandate through inspection but instead reacted to customer 
complaints about a lack of calories on the menu, and Albany County stopped enforcement six months after the law 
was implemented.   
10 A related literature, using laboratory and field experiments, suggests that providing nutritional information can 
affect meal decisions (e.g., Burton et al., 2006; Roberto et al., 2010; Wisdom et al., 2010; Ellison et al., 2013; 
Bedard and Kuhn, 2015; VanEpps et al., 2016; Cawley et al., 2018). 
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law and control groups constructed using customers eating at the same restaurant chains in 
neighboring areas.  Results from this body of work are mixed.  For example, Elbel et al. (2009, 
2011) find no evidence that the New York City mandate influenced calories ordered among adults, 
adolescents, or children in low-income neighborhoods.  However, Bollinger et al. (2011) found 
that the New York City law reduced calories ordered at Starbucks restaurants by 6%.  The evidence 
on the effects of the mandates using data from restaurants in and around King County, WA is also 
mixed – Finkelstein et al. (2011) report no effect on calories ordered at Taco Time Northwest 
restaurants and Krieger et al. (2013) estimate a reduction in calories ordered at taco and coffee 
restaurants but not burger and sandwich restaurants.11   
The mixed results from this first wave of studies points to limitations inherent to focusing 
on a small number of restaurants in a particular geographic area.  Consumer preferences and 
knowledge vary across locations, and the extent of misinformation about calories could differ 
across different types of restaurants.  The ambiguity could also reflect sorting, as calorie labeling 
could influence the types of people who eat at particular types of restaurants.  Additionally, 
inconsistent enforcement could lead to unobserved heterogeneity in the likelihood any given 
establishment posted calorie counts.  Finally, such analyses are susceptible to the concerns about 
common trends and understated standard errors in comparative case studies with a small number 
of treated units (Abadie et al., 2010). 
A more recent set of studies has used data from the BRFSS to shift the focus of this work 
from estimating the impacts of calorie mandates on calories ordered to BMI.  For example, 
Restrepo (2017) compared changes in BMI in the counties in New York State that implemented 
 
11 Auchincloss et al. (2013) is the only paper to estimate the effect of the mandate in Philadelphia and finds that the 
customers eating in treated restaurants consume 151 fewer calories than do counterparts eating at the same chain in 
surrounding areas. 
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calorie labeling laws to changes in other counties in the state and found that the local laws reduced 
both average BMI by 0.4 kg/m2 (or approximately 1.5 percent) and the probability of being obese 
by 3 percentage points.  Yelowitz (2016) uses a sample consisting of respondents from the thirty 
largest U.S. cities, which includes several that had passed a calorie mandate, and finds that such 
mandates caused small and statistically insignificant reductions in both average BMI and the 
probability of being obese.12  Deb and Vargas (2016) were the first to utilize data from every 
location that passed a calorie mandate to estimate the effect of such policies.13  To do so, they 
implement a data-driven entropy balancing procedure to reweight the control group in a way that 
best matches the treatment group’s pre-treatment BMI trajectory and find small reductions in 
average BMI for both men and women.   
Our approach differs from this prior work along multiple important dimensions.  First, we 
worked with a health policy legal expert to develop a more rigorous classification of treatment and 
control groups.  Prior work identified treatment groups utilizing information on the passage and 
intended effective dates of local calorie labeling laws.  Such a strategy does not account for the 
fact that many of these local laws were either repealed or never actually enforced due to expected 
preemption from the ACA’s national mandate.  Our strategy for identifying treated areas was to 
separately classify each law using a combination of legal statutes, media articles, and direct 
correspondence with state and local health departments.  In doing so, we conclude that many of 
the “treated” areas of Yelowitz (2016) and Deb and Vargas (2016) were either never actually 
treated (e.g., Oregon) or only temporarily treated (e.g., California, whose law was repealed).  We 
 
12 Cities that passed a local mandate and were thus considered treated include New York, Philadelphia, Seattle, 
Portland, Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Jose, San Diego, and Boston. 
13 Their treated areas include New York City; the counties of King (WA), Multnomah (OR), Albany (NY), 
Schenectady (NY), Suffolk (NY), Philadelphia (PA); and the states of California, Maine, Massachusetts, and 
Oregon.  The control areas included Connecticut, Delaware, New Hampshire, Maryland, New Jersey, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, Arizona, Idaho, and Nevada.   
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use as treated areas only those for which we were able to document that the law was actually 
implemented as intended and was never repealed.  As shown in Table 1, these include the five 
counties of New York City; King County, WA; Philadelphia County, PA; Albany, Schenectady, 
Suffolk, and Westchester County, NY; Montgomery County, MD; and the state of Vermont.  We 
further validate these choices by using phone calls to restaurants and consumer surveys to 
document clear differences in the prevalence of calorie labeling between these treatment sites and 
neighboring areas, as described below. 
A second difference between our approach and the prior literature is that we evaluate 
calorie-labeling laws through the lens of a theoretical framework, which highlights that changes 
in consumer behavior need not lead to increased consumer welfare.  This differs from the standard 
economic model whereby calorie provision can only influence choices by rectifying imperfect 
information.  Since calorie-labeling laws do not (directly) impose a monetary cost on the 
consumer, prior work has assumed that any resulting changes in food selections are unambiguously 
welfare improving.14  In contrast, our framework allows for calorie labels to trigger moral costs 
that are akin to a tax on high calorie meals.  The net effect of labeling laws on consumer welfare 
is thus theoretically ambiguous but can be inferred using available data.  To evaluate this 
possibility, we go beyond prior work and look not only at changes in average BMI and across the 
BMI distribution but also heterogeneous changes in subjective well-being across treatment and 
control areas as a way to understand why calorie labels impact consumer choice. 
III. Theoretical Model 
 
14 Such sentiment is highlighted in Bollinger et al. (2011) who write that, “…as far as regulatory policies go, the 
costs of calorie posting are very low – so even these small benefits could outweigh the costs.” 
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It is well known that the environment (or choice architecture) in which people make 
decisions affects their choices (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).  We assume that individuals choose an 
element 𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑋 (with the interpretation that 𝑥𝑥 represents calories) in a given environment 𝑒𝑒 ∈  𝐸𝐸 
(the environment could be multidimensional). 
We adapt the framework in Jimenez-Gomez (2019) to model the calorie nudge.  First, we 
define “experienced utility” 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒) as the “hedonic experience associated with an outcome” 
(Kahneman and Thaler, 2006), that for our purposes also includes the health effects associated 
with consumption. 15   People, however, do not always maximize their experienced utility 
(Kahneman et al., 1997; Berridge, 2003).  Formally, we define “decision utility” 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒) as the 
utility that individual 𝑖𝑖  maximizes, and the “internality” 𝛬𝛬𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒)  as the difference between 
individual 𝑖𝑖’s decision and experienced utility: 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒) = 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒) + 𝛬𝛬𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒). 
The internality 𝛬𝛬𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒) could be due to lack of information about the calorie content of foods, but 
it also encompasses other sources of non-utility-maximizing behavior such as lack of attention, 
“cognitive bandwidth”, or time inconsistency (Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013; Courtemanche et 
al., 2015a).16  Calorie labels might reduce this internality by providing relevant information to 
individuals and/or increasing the saliency of choosing healthy food. 
Critics of nudges have argued that nudges might impose a psychological cost (Glaeser, 
2006).  As described by Levitt and List (2007), utility depends not only on consumption but also 
on a “moral cost” for violating social norms.  Nudges can increase this moral cost.  For instance, 
 
15 We define 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒) formally below, as a function of calories consumed and the weight associated with calorie 
consumption. 
16 In particular, the bias could arise from individuals having incorrect expectations about how much they will enjoy 
consumption, for example, due to projection bias (Loewenstein et al., 2003). 
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in the charitable giving literature, Andreoni and Rao (2011) and DellaVigna et al. (2012) have 
argued that being asked to give imposes a “shadow tax” of guilt that can only be removed by 
giving.  It becomes optimal to give conditional on being asked, but people may be left worse off 
than if they had never been asked.  A parallel process could apply to calorie labels.  Seeing a high 
calorie count for a preferred item may impose a “shadow tax” of guilt that induces a lower-calorie 
choice, but the consumer’s resulting utility may be lower than if she had never seen the information 
and had chosen the unhealthy item.  In other words, the motivation for the healthier choice may be 
guilt rather than health.  
We incorporate the idea of a moral cost by assuming that experienced utility 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒, which 
is the relevant concept for welfare analysis, is  
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒) = 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥) − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒) − 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥), 
where 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥) is the utility from choice 𝑥𝑥, which does not depend on the environment, 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) is the 
price of choice 𝑥𝑥, and 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒), is the psychological/moral cost from consuming highly caloric 
foods, which depends on the environment, i.e., whether one is aware of the amount of calories. 
Following the literature on the economics of obesity (Philipson and Posner 1999), we assume 
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥) =  𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥,𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥)�, where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥) is the individual’s weight, which is increasing in 𝑥𝑥.  Utility 
𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖  depends on the consumption of 𝑥𝑥  and also the individual’s weight.  We assume that 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 is 
increasing and concave in 𝑥𝑥.17  Therefore, the individual’s decision utility, which is the relevant 
one for understanding her choices, is 
 
17 We assume that 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖  is increasing and concave in 𝑥𝑥, concave in 𝑤𝑤.  Moreover, we assume for simplicity that weight 
𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥) increases linearly with calorie consumption.  This means that  
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖







and we assume that the former is negative, so 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥) is concave. This would be true if, for example, the marginal 
increase in weight with respect to calories, 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥), is sufficiently small in comparison to the concavity of 𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 , 
measured by 𝜕𝜕2𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥2⁄  . 
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𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒) = 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒) + 𝛬𝛬𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒) =  𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥) − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒) − 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) + 𝛬𝛬𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒). 18 
Let 𝑒𝑒0 be the status quo (i.e., no nudge), and 𝑒𝑒1 be an environment where there are calorie labels. 
We make the following assumptions: 
1. Choice 𝑥𝑥 represents a number of calories, so individuals are indifferent between foods with 
the same number of calories. 





all 𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑋, and we assume 𝛬𝛬𝑖𝑖(0|𝑒𝑒) = 0  for 𝑒𝑒 ∈ {𝑒𝑒0, 𝑒𝑒1}.  
3. The nudge has a psychological cost: 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒0) = 0 for all 𝑥𝑥, 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒1) ≥ 0, 𝜕𝜕𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥�𝑒𝑒1�𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒 > 0 for 
all 𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝑋𝑋. 
Let 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖





𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥) − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥�𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗� − 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) + 𝛬𝛬𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥�𝑒𝑒𝑗𝑗�  .  
Observation: 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖1 < 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖0, i.e., the nudge reduces calorie consumed. This is so because, for all 𝑥𝑥, we 
have that 𝛬𝛬𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒1) ≤ 𝛬𝛬𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒0) and 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒1) ≥ 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒0). Therefore, a higher choice of 𝑥𝑥 yields 
less decision utility and has a higher psychological cost under the nudge, so the optimal choice of 
𝑥𝑥 must be lower in that case. 
The welfare gain/loss from the nudge for individual 𝑖𝑖 is given by 
∆𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 = 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖1|𝑒𝑒1) − 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖0|𝑒𝑒0) = 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖1) − 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖0) − [𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖1�𝑒𝑒1) − 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖0�𝑒𝑒0)] − [𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖1) − 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖0)].  
 
18 We assume that the individual’s utility is quasilinear in money. Therefore, as long as the price 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥) is small 
compared with the individual’s wealth, we can ignore her budget constraint.  
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Proposition 1 (Jimenez-Gomez, 2019). A sufficient condition for the nudge to increase welfare 
for individual 𝑖𝑖 is 
𝛬𝛬𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖0�𝑒𝑒1) − 𝛬𝛬𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖1�𝑒𝑒1) ≥ 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖0�𝑒𝑒1).       (1) 
A sufficient condition for the nudge to decrease welfare for individual 𝑖𝑖 is 
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖1�𝑒𝑒1) ≥ 𝛬𝛬𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖0�𝑒𝑒0) − 𝛬𝛬𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖1�𝑒𝑒0).       (2) 
So far, we have described the model using a representative individual.  However, 
heterogeneity in the population is crucial when considering behavioral welfare economics (Allcott 
and Taubinsky, 2015; Taubinsky and Rees-Jones, 2018; Allcott and Kessler, 2019).  Suppose that 
the population can be divided in two groups, H and L (for high and low information).  Suppose, 
moreover, that individual ℎ ∈  𝐻𝐻 has no internality in her decision-making, because she has access 
to all the information and cognitive resources she needs, so 𝛬𝛬ℎ(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒0)  =  𝛬𝛬ℎ(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒1)  =  0 for all 
𝑥𝑥 ∈  𝑋𝑋.  Then, from Equation (2), we find that the nudge decreases her welfare as long as there is 
some psychological cost, since the right-hand side is 0. 
On the other hand, suppose that an individual 𝑙𝑙 ∈  𝐿𝐿 has a large internality in the absence 
of the nudge, but the nudge reduces the internality as well as the consumption of calories, so that 
𝛬𝛬𝑙𝑙(𝑥𝑥𝑙𝑙0�𝑒𝑒1) −  𝛬𝛬𝑙𝑙(𝑥𝑥𝑙𝑙1|𝑒𝑒1) is large.19  Then, from Equation (1), we have that the nudge will increase 
her welfare as long as the psychological cost is not too large. 
Note that the comparisons between the internality and the cost are relative to 𝑥𝑥.  For small 
𝑥𝑥 (i.e., foods which are low in calories), we expect both the internality and the psychological cost 
to be low; the opposite is true for high-calorie foods.  If 𝑥𝑥𝑙𝑙0, the choice in the absence of the nudge 
was a high-calorie food, then from Equation (1), the nudge will increase the welfare of individual 
 
19 Because the nudge reduces the internality and increases psychological/moral costs, we have that  𝑥𝑥𝑙𝑙0 > 𝑥𝑥𝑙𝑙1.  
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𝑙𝑙  if the psychological cost for eating high calorie foods is smaller than the reduction in the 
internality for those high calorie foods. 
Predictions. From the previous arguments, we have the following predictions: 
1. Everybody (both in H and L) will decrease calorie consumption; 
2. Those in H will have a welfare loss from the interventions; and 
3. The welfare effect in L is ambiguous, and it depends on the relative size of the internality 
and the psychological cost associated with the nudge. 
 
The model we have described is quite general, and our results are consistent with any situation that 
fits the described assumptions.20  In terms of welfare, the argument for critics of nudges usually 
rests in Equation (2): when the psychological cost is high, and people are already informed and 
make unbiased decisions, the nudge can only decrease welfare.  However, as importantly, Equation 
(1) shows that for those who do not make unbiased decisions (because they suffer from 
internalities), the nudge can be a source of welfare.  The nudge will be more likely to increase 
social welfare when the internalities of the L group are larger, when the relative size of the L group 
with respect to group H grows, and when there were negative externalities derived from 
consumption.  It will be more likely to decrease social welfare when the psychological costs (for 
either group) are larger (we derive this formally in Appendix A). 
 
IV. Data 
Identification of treatment and control areas 
 
20 We provide the analysis of a scenario with the possibility of learning about calories for groups with different 
levels of bias in Appendix A. 
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Our identification strategy involves comparing counties that implemented calorie labeling 
laws to proximate areas that did not implement such laws. Our main analysis sample therefore 
includes the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) of New York City (the “treated” counties are 
the five counties of New York City, Suffolk County, and Westchester County; the control counties 
are the other counties in the area), Philadelphia (treated county is Philadelphia), Seattle (treated 
county is King), Washington DC (treated county is Montgomery), and Albany (treated counties 
are Albany and Schenectady) as well as the entire census division of New England (treated state 
is Vermont).21,22  We excluded observations from localities where menu labeling laws were passed 
but, due to anticipated preemption by the ACA, were never implemented or enforced. We do this 
because it is unclear that these areas can truly be considered control units since some restaurants 
may have started posting calories in anticipation of the laws taking effect. Within our geographic 
areas of interest, the dropped areas include Maine, Massachusetts and New Jersey as well as 
Nassau County in New York.  
While using proximate geographic areas as control groups increases the likelihood that the 
treatment and control groups experience similar local economic conditions, one concern with this 
identification strategy is that restaurant chains may voluntarily post calories on menus.  As a result, 
restaurants in the control group areas may display calorie counts on menus even though they are 
not required to do so.  Thus, individuals in our control group areas may be exposed to calorie labels 
 
21 Ulster County, NY also passed, implemented, and enforced a menu labeling law.  However, we exclude Ulster 
County from the sample because it is the only county within its MSA, meaning that there are not similar controls as 
the other treated counties.  The results are robust to including Ulster County as a treated county, without any 
corresponding control counties or also including adjacent Orange County, NY as an additional control county.   
22 The sample spans from 1994 through 2012 for the analysis of BMI and 2005 through 2010 for the analysis of life 
satisfaction.  The Washington DC MSA and census division of New England are excluded from the life satisfaction 
analysis because there are no treated observations in those areas between 2005 and 2010 but are included in the 
analysis of BMI because there are treated observations in 2011 and 2012.  Specifically, the treated county in the 
Washington DC MSA – Montgomery County, MD – implemented its law in July 2010, and its 2010 BRFSS 
respondents were all surveyed before then.  The treated state in New England – Vermont – implemented its law in 
January 2011. 
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when eating at select chains regardless of location.  Additionally, customers who reside in the 
control group areas may dine at restaurants in treated regions and, thus, be exposed to calorie 
counts.  Alternatively, customers in the treated and control group regions may be unaware of 
calorie counts on menus when selecting their meals.   
To the extent that these concerns are valid, they should serve to minimize differences across 
treated and control areas and attenuate the estimated effects.  In this regard, our estimates should 
be considered intent-to-treat effects and, hence, a lower bound on the impacts of calorie labels on 
food choices.  To understand the severity of these concerns, we examine differences in compliance 
and awareness using two supplemental data sources. 
To address the first concern, we called approximately 17,000 restaurants in our sample 
areas to inquire whether they were currently posting calories on menus.  These restaurants 
encompassed all locations of the top 500 chains by sales volume with at least 15 locations 
nationwide.23  The calls were made in early spring 2017 prior to the implementation date (May 
2018) of the federal calorie mandate.  Of the 2800 restaurants in the regions that were actively 
enforcing local mandates (New York City, Westchester County, Suffolk County, Philadelphia 
County, Schenectady County, and Montgomery County), approximately 82.9% of all 
establishments were compliant with the local mandate and posting calories on menus and menu 
boards.  Of the 1300 restaurants in the regions that had mandates but were not actively enforcing 
them (King County, Albany County, and Vermont), approximately 73.4% of all establishments 
were posting calories.  Finally, of the 13,000 restaurants in the control regions, nearly 57.9% of all 
establishments were voluntarily posting calories on menus. 
 
23 The top 500 restaurant chains by sales volume are drawn from the 2016 Technomic Top 500 Chain Restaurant 
Advance Report.  Given that many of the chains outside of the top 400 by sales volume have less than 15 locations, 
these 500 chains likely encompass nearly all restaurants required to post calories by the local mandates. 
 20  
Viewed in its totality, the call data suggest that, while a substantial fraction of restaurants 
are voluntarily providing caloric information on menus, there are significant differences in the 
prevalence of calorie posting across regions.  This suggests that restaurants are responding to the 
stringency of local mandates, which could introduce heterogeneity in the likelihood consumers 
observe calorie counts across these different regions.  Moreover, these differences likely understate 
the differences that were present during our sample period, which ends in 2012.  No chain 
restaurants voluntarily posted calories on menus in all their locations until the very end of our 
sample period, whereas several did by the time of our phone calls in 2017.  
To examine whether consumers observe calorie counts on menus, we surveyed 
approximately 4000 adults in December 2016 throughout our regions in collaboration with 
Qualtrics Panels to construct a representative sample on age, gender, and education.  We asked 
consumers to describe whether they had noticed calorie counts on the menu or menu board of 
every meal they had eaten at a restaurant during the previous 24 hours.  In regions that were 
actively enforcing local calorie-posting mandates, 44.0% of respondents reported that they had 
noticed calorie counts on the menu.  In regions that were not actively enforcing local mandates, 
39.2% of respondents noticed calorie counts on menus, and in regions that did not have a local 
mandate, 35.6% of respondents reported that they had such information.  It is important to note 
that these percentages are based on the home residence of the respondent, not the location of the 
restaurant where they had eaten; hence, it is possible that respondents living in the control group 
regions observed calorie counts while eating at a restaurant in the treated region. Despite this 
possibility, we still see that individuals residing in areas actively enforcing calorie-posting 
requirements were 24% more likely to have observed calorie counts when eating away at a 
restaurant than were counterparts residing in control areas.   
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These survey results suggest that a substantial fraction of consumers recalled observing 
calorie counts when dining at restaurants.  While consumers who reside in the control group areas 
were exposed to calorie counts, consumers in the treatment regions were more likely to notice 
calorie counts on menus when dining at restaurants.24  Given that heterogeneity in the enforcement 
of local calorie-posting requirements corresponds to differences in the likelihood that restaurants 
post calories on menus and heterogeneity in the likelihood that consumers residing in treatment 
and control groups observe calories on menus, we estimate both the average impact of calorie-
posting laws and the differential impact of these laws based on the stringency of local enforcement. 
 
BRFSS Data and Outcome Measures 
Our primary data source is the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) for 
the period between 1994 and 2012. The BRFSS is a random-digit-dialing telephone survey 
conducted by state health departments and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). 
The BRFSS collects information about adults’ health, health-related behaviors, and demographic 
characteristics.  Importantly for our purposes, the BRFSS also includes state and county identifiers; 
however, county identifiers are not publicly available after 2012.  In addition, as chain restaurants 
began voluntarily posting calorie counts on menus in all their locations in 2012, ending our sample 
 
24 These results likely understate the extent of heterogeneity in our sample period as consumers in the control group 
became more likely to observe calorie counts over time.  The survey in December 2016 provides an estimate of 
consumer awareness of calorie posting during a time period that corresponds to the spring 2017 estimates of 
voluntary posting of calories by restaurants.  In an earlier wave of the survey in December 2014, 44.1% of 
consumers in areas that actively enforced local mandates noticed calorie counts in restaurants, which is the same 
percentage as December 2016.  However, fewer percentages of respondents noticed calorie counts in other regions.  
In December 2014, 36.2% of respondents in areas with local mandates that were not actively enforced noticed 
calorie counts, and 30.4% of respondents in areas without a local mandate noticed calorie counts in restaurants.  
Further, our BRFSS sample ends in 2012, when chain restaurants first started voluntarily posting calorie counts, so 
the percent of consumers in the control group who observed calorie counts in restaurants is likely much lower during 
the sample period.  
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in 2012 minimizes the likelihood of attenuation bias driven by exposure to calorie counts in 
restaurants voluntarily posting such information in control areas. 
We construct our main analysis sample as follows.  First, pooling all observations from 
1994-2012 yields 5,232,786 respondents.  Restricting geography to the treatment and control areas 
leaves 614,179 respondents.  From this sample, we exclude 5,608 pregnant women and 14,207 
individuals with missing information.  The final sample consists of 594,364 individuals. 
The theoretical model from section III predicts impacts on calorie consumption and utility.  
While we do not observe these outcomes directly, we use BMI and life satisfaction as proxies for 
these outcomes in our empirical analysis.25  BMI is computed based on self-reported measures of 
height and weight, as weight in kilograms divided by the square of height in meters.26   
Given that the BRFSS data do not include food consumption or calories consumed, we use 
information on other health-related behaviors – smoking, alcohol consumption, and exercise – that 
could influence BMI absent changes in calories consumed.  Examining these outcomes allows us 
to determine whether any observed changes in BMI reflect changes in our unobserved measure of 
interest (calories consumed) or a broader array of behavioral change.  Smoking is measured as 
whether the individual currently smokes cigarettes.  Alcohol consumption is measured as the 
number of drinks consumed during the past 30 days.  The physical activity outcomes are any 
 
25 Empirically, using caloric intake as an outcome is not feasible since the only government survey dataset with a 
comprehensive food diary – the National Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys (NHANES) – is not nearly 
large enough and does not have the geographic scope to precisely identify the impact of this intervention. The 
predicted effect of calorie labeling on BMI is of the same sign (negative) as the predicted effect on calorie intake as 
long as calorie expenditure is unaffected. 
26 Self-reported weight and height admittedly suffer from measurement error, and Cawley (2004) and Courtemanche 
et al. (2015b) develop “corrections” that adjust self-reports based on the comparison of actual and self-reported 
values in the NHANES. We elect not to implement these corrections in this paper because the sample period does 
not correspond in a straightforward way to the NHANES survey periods, and assumptions made about how to 
reconcile the difference could potentially induce more error than the correction solves. Further, researchers studying 
determinants of obesity have repeatedly found that implementing such corrections does not substantively impact 
results (Courtemanche et al., 2015b; Courtemanche et al., 2016). Finally, in our particular context, the nature of 
reporting error is not likely to differ across treatment and control areas. 
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exercise in the past thirty days besides a regular job (available in all waves), the average minutes 
of moderate exercise per week over the past month (collected only in odd years between 2001 and 
2011), and the average minutes of vigorous exercise per week over the past month (odd years 
between 2001 and 2011).27 
The BRFSS data include a question about life satisfaction, which has been used in prior 
work to evaluate the effects on consumer well-being of policy changes such as German re-
unification (Frijters et al., 2004), cigarette taxes (Gruber and Mullainathan, 2005), and the 
provision of improved housing for the poor (Galiani et al., 2018).  While the use of self-reported 
life satisfaction is not beyond reproach (Deaton and Stone, 2016), it has been proposed as a useful 
proxy for experienced utility (Kahneman and Sugden, 2005) and is negatively correlated with more 
objective measures such as demand for antidepressants (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2016).28,29 
The BRFSS collected information on life satisfaction in the 2005 through 2010 waves. 
While we are therefore only able to use those years to examine the impact on life satisfaction, this 
period still allows for identifying variation from all the calorie labeling laws except for 
Montgomery County, MD (which was implemented in July 2010) and Vermont (which was 
implemented in 2011).  The life satisfaction question’s choices are very satisfied, satisfied, 
dissatisfied, and very dissatisfied.  We use the same ordinal definition in our analyses. 
 
27 Restrepo (2017) measures physical activity as any exercise in the past 30 days and the number of minutes of any 
form of exercise in the past 30 days; he finds no impact of the New York City law on physical activity. 
28 There is evidence that self-reported life satisfaction is correlated with experienced utility. For example, Perez-
Truglia (2015) provides evidence from a validation test that expenditure shares predicted by life satisfaction 
questions are highly correlated with changes in actual expenditure shares on different categories of food 
consumption.  Similarly, Benjamin et al. (2012) show that stated measures of subjective well-being on life 
satisfaction are a powerful predictor of stated choices, what is to be expected if life satisfaction is a good proxy for 
experienced utility. 
29 We would prefer to have a broader set of questions upon which to build our measure of well-being and recover 
associated measures of relative marginal utility, as in Benjamin et al. (2014).  Unfortunately, our data only include a 
single question on life satisfaction, so we are unable to develop a more comprehensive measure. 
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The BRFSS data also include a number of demographic and socioeconomics characteristics 
of the respondents, such as race/ethnicity, educational attainment, age, gender, and marital status.  
As these variables are correlated with our outcomes of interest, we incorporate them into our 
empirical model described below.  In addition, as the BRFSS data include county of residence, we 
are able to construct county-level socioeconomic characteristics using data from the U.S. Census 
Bureau and Bureau of Labor Statistics that could also be correlated with our outcomes of interest. 
 
V. Effects on Body Mass Index 
Our theoretical model predicts that all consumer types will reduce calories consumed when 
exposed to calorie counts on menus.  As noted earlier, the BRFSS data do not include information 
on the amount of calories consumed.  To test this hypothesis, we instead rely on an alternate 
measure, BMI, which is directly impacted by calories consumed.  Specifically, our model predicts 
that we should observe reductions in BMI in treated areas relative to control areas following the 
implementation of local mandates.  We evaluate this prediction by estimating the average effect 
of chain restaurant calorie posting mandates on BMI using a difference-in-differences design.   
In doing so, we estimate the following empirical model: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝜷𝜷𝟐𝟐𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝜷𝜷𝟑𝟑𝒁𝒁𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑 + 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 ,  (3) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖  is the outcome variable (BMI) for individual 𝑖𝑖 in county 𝑐𝑐  in time period 𝑡𝑡.  Since 
survey data are collected monthly and we have the exact month and year when the laws were 
implemented, the time unit is “month-year” (e.g., April 2008).  The treatment variable is defined 
as 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑊𝑊𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 and is a dichotomous variable equal to one whenever a chain restaurant calorie labeling 
law is implemented in county 𝑐𝑐  in month-year 𝑡𝑡 .  The associated coefficient 𝛽𝛽1  measures the 
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average treatment effect of a menu labeling law on the outcome variable and provides a test of our 
first hypothesis that the introduction of calorie labels leads to reductions in BMI.  
 We control for a number of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of individuals, 
denoted by 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊, including race/ethnicity, educational attainment, age, gender, and marital status.  
The race/ethnicity variables are indicators for whether the individual is non-Hispanic white (the 
reference), non-Hispanic black, Hispanic, or other race/ethnicity.  Educational attainment is 
characterized by four mutually exclusive categories for whether the individual did not obtain a 
high-school degree (the reference), obtained a high-school degree, attended college but did not 
graduate, or obtained a college degree. We include dummy variables for each individual year of 
age. We also use indicator variables for females and married individuals.  
County level controls (𝒁𝒁𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊) include continuous variables for annual population density, 
monthly unemployment rate, and annual median household income. The population density 
measure is constructed as the number of people per square mile using U.S. Census Bureau 
information on population estimates for each year and land area estimates from 2000. We obtained 
data on median income estimates for each year from the Census Bureau and local area 
unemployment rates for each month from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
Equation (3) also includes county fixed effects 𝛼𝛼𝑑𝑑, month-year fixed effects 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖, and county-
specific linear time trends 𝛾𝛾𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡. The last term, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖, is an idiosyncratic error term. Standard errors 
are clustered at the county level and are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. There are 110 counties in 
our sample so concerns about inference with a small number of clusters should not apply in our 
case (Cameron and Miller, 2015). We utilize sampling weights in all analyses. The BRFSS did not 
start to incorporate cell phones into its sampling frame until 2011, and the sampling weights are 
designed to adjust for the resulting changes in the composition of the sample.   
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In sum, our identification strategy accounts for an array of observable characteristics as 
well as unobservable characteristics that are constant within counties, constant within time periods, 
or change linearly within counties. In other words, ?̂?𝛽1 gives the causal effect of menu labeling laws 
under the relatively weak assumption that the implementation of such laws is uncorrelated with 
unobservable county characteristics that change non-linearly.   
To examine the plausibility of this identification strategy, we examine whether the 
characteristics of individuals in the treated and control group regions are similar prior to the 
implementation of the first calorie-posting requirement and also whether the trends in BMI are 
parallel for these two groups during the pre-treatment period.  We additionally conduct a series of 
robustness checks, including an event study analysis, and falsification tests that provide further 
support of the plausibility of this identification strategy; such results are reported in Appendix B.  
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the outcome variables and covariates from the pre-
treatment period (1994-2007) for the treated and control groups.  The weight outcomes of the 
treatment and control groups were very similar prior to the implementation of calorie labeling 
mandates: for both groups, average BMI was around 26.1 kg/m2 while 36% were overweight but 
not obese (25 ≤ BMI < 30), 12%-13% were Class I obese (30 ≤ BMI < 35), and 6% were Class 
II/III obese (BMI ≥ 35).  Pre-treatment life satisfaction was somewhat lower in the treatment group 
than the control group, though our identification strategy will be able to control for such baseline 
differences through the inclusion of county fixed effects and county-specific linear time trends. 
The treatment and control groups were broadly similar along the dimensions of education, age, 
and gender, but the control group was somewhat wealthier, had a smaller proportion of 
racial/ethnic minorities, and lived in less densely populated counties. Again, our identification 
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strategy will be able to account for these differences through the inclusion of county fixed effects 
and county-specific linear time trends.   
Figure 1 presents annual changes in average BMI in the treatment and control locations 
during our sample period. The vertical line, drawn between 2007 and 2008, reflects the timing of 
the first calorie labeling law, implemented by New York City in 2008.  As can be observed in the 
figure, the treatment and control groups exhibited very similar levels and trends in average BMI 
in the pre-treatment period.  Thus, Figure 1 provides visual evidence consistent with the identifying 
assumption and suggests that the individuals in the control group provide a valid counterfactual 
for the outcomes of individuals in the treatment group. 
Additionally, as shown in Figure 1, BMI in the treatment group drops in 2008 – right after 
the implementation of the New York City law – and then stabilizes throughout the rest of the post-
treatment period.  In contrast, BMI in the control group continues on its steady upward trajectory 
during the post-treatment period. This graph therefore provides evidence that menu labeling laws 
may decrease BMI.  To more formally assess the impact of the New York City law and subsequent 
local mandates, we next report estimates from the difference-in-differences design of equation (3). 
Estimation results for BMI are presented in Table 3. We only report the coefficient 
estimates for 𝛽𝛽1. We find that calorie posting laws lead to a decrease in BMI of 0.17 kg/m2 on 
average, as shown in column (1).  This change in BMI corresponds to a 1.5-pound reduction in 
weight at the mean height of the sample and a reduction of 0.7% relative to the mean of the 
treatment group prior to the implementation of calorie posting laws.   
We show that these results are robust to utilizing alternate control variables, time periods, 
and control group definitions in Appendix B.  Further, in a series of falsification tests, we create a 
series of placebo variables as if the laws occurred in years before they were actually implemented 
 28  
and find that there is no influence of the placebo calorie mandates.  Importantly, these falsification 
tests provide evidence consistent with the identifying assumption of equation (3), which is that 
there is a common counterfactual trend in the dependent variable between the treated and control 
groups.  Results from an event-study design, showing that there are no impacts on BMI in the years 
leading up to the implementation of the laws, are also consistent with the identifying assumption.30  
Additionally, the inference is robust to clustering the standard errors at larger geographic units 
than counties. 
To better relate the average treatment effects reported in column (1) to the prevalence of 
calorie labels on menus reported in chain restaurants, we augment equation (3) to include variables 
denoting that the law was passed but not yet implemented and that the law was implemented but 
is not actively enforced.  The first indicator allows us to examine anticipatory effects from 
restaurants posting calories on menus before the local mandates were implemented.31  The second 
indicator allows us to examine whether the influence of calorie posting laws depends on the 
stringency with which treated regions enforce local mandates.  As noted earlier in section IV, the 
likelihood that consumers observed calorie counts on menus was lower in areas that did not 
actively enforce local mandates.  This later variable is equal to one in the regions of King County 
after May 2010, Albany County after September 2010, and Vermont; the coefficient estimate 
 
30 The estimate could be biased if the treatment effect of each law varies over time, given the staggered 
implementation of the laws (Goodman-Bacon, 2018).  This bias is not likely to be a concern in this case.  The 
BRFSS sample spans from 1994 to 2012, while the laws were implemented from April 2008 to January 2011.  
Except for New York City, the laws were implemented within a two-year period.  Restrepo (2017) finds that the 
impact of the New York City law does not vary over time; the estimate for the first year after implementation is 
similar to the estimate for the third year after implementation.  Additionally, as shown in Appendix B, the results are 
robust across different sample periods and robust to excluding observations from one treated or control area at a 
time.  Further, the estimate from the difference-in-differences design is similar to the estimate from the event-study 
design.  Thus, the results are robust to concerns related to staggered implementation of the laws. 
31 Anticipatory effects could also occur due to public health messaging and information campaigns surrounding the 
passage of these mandates (Rees-Jones and Rozema, 2020). 
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provides evidence of whether the influence of calorie posting laws depends on the intensity of 
enforcement.   
Results from column (2) of Table 3 provide evidence of the importance of controlling for 
the stringency of enforcement.  While our estimates show that actively enforced laws reduce BMI 
by 0.19 kg/m2, the estimated effect for laws in regions that are enacted but not actively enforced 
is an increase of 0.13 kg/m2, which is not statistically significant at any meaningful level.  The 
estimated effect on the indicator for passage of the local law is near zero and positive (0.001 with 
a standard error of 0.099), which rules out that the average treatment effect reported in column (1) 
reflects anticipatory changes.   
Based on the totality of the findings, the results in column (2) suggest that the average 
treatment effect is driven by active enforcement of local mandates and hence likely reflects 
exposure to calorie labels on menus in chain restaurants rather than other factors related to the 
passage and implementation of local mandates.  To further explore this conjecture, we examine 
the impact of menu labeling laws on smoking, drinking, and physical activity, as these behaviors 
could also influence BMI in the absence of changes in calories consumed.  These results are shown 
in Table 4.  Across all of these outcomes, the estimates of the impact of implementation of the law 
are not statistically significant and small in magnitude relative to the sample mean.  This reinforces 
our interpretation of the estimates in Table 3 that the changes in BMI reflect changes in calories 
consumed due to exposure to calorie labels on menus.   
Before proceeding, it is interesting to note that our estimated effects for changes in BMI 
are significantly lower than what would be predicted based upon experimental estimates of calorie 
labels on calories consumed at restaurants (Wisdom et al., 2010; VanEpps et al., 2016; Cawley et 
al., 2018).  For comparison, Wisdom et al. (2010) find that including calories and daily calorie 
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recommendations on menus in a fast-food restaurant decreased the amount of calories ordered in 
a meal by 99 calories, which is predicted to decrease BMI by 0.75 kg/m2 within one year.32  
VanEpps et al. (2016) find that including calories on online menus for a large corporate cafeteria 
led to a 60 calorie reduction in the number of calories ordered, which is predicted to decrease BMI 
by 0.47 kg/m2 within one year.  Cawley et al. (2018) find that including calories on the menu in a 
full-service restaurant reduced the number of calories ordered by 45 calories, which is predicted 
to decrease BMI by 0.35 kg/m2 within one year.33 
Viewed through the lens of recent work on scalability, however, such divergence is not 
particularly surprising (Al-Ubaydli et al., 2017a; Al-Ubaydli et al., 2017b).  By design of the local 
mandates, individuals have the ability to avoid calorie labels by choosing to eat at restaurants that 
are not required to post calories on menus.  To the extent that calorie labels trigger guilt/impose a 
psychic cost on the consumption of high calorie foods, we would expect some individuals to switch 
where they eat to avoid exposure to calorie labels.34  Such sorting would attenuate the effect of the 
mandate by limiting the number of meals purchased at restaurants affected by the laws.  Moreover, 
our data suggests imperfect compliance as many chain restaurants – particularly those in treated 
areas that did not actively enforce the local mandate – report that they do not post calories on 
menus.  Given results in Table 3 that there was no impact on BMI in regions where the local 
mandate was not actively enforced, we would expect the average effect of calorie labels in our  
32 Menu-labeling laws require both providing calorie information and the daily calorie recommendation on menus.  
Providing calorie information only led to a decrease of 61 calories ordered in a meal, which is predicted to decrease 
BMI by 0.46 kg/m2 within one year (Wisdom et al., 2010). 
33 The predicted decrease in BMI within one year is based on the estimated decrease in calories ordered in Wisdom 
et al. (2010), VanEpps et al. (2016), and Cawley et al. (2018); the baseline height in each sample; and the result in 
Hall et al. (2011) that a decrease of 10 calories per day will eventually lead to weight loss of one pound, with half of 
the weight change occurring within one year. 
34 We are not the first to note the role of sorting to avoid social pressures or moral costs.  Prior work in charitable 
giving and sharing in dictator games has shown how the ability to avoid the ask (or opportunity to share) impacts 
subsequent rates of giving and the interpretation of motives for doing so (Andreoni et al., 2017; DellaVigna et al., 
2012; Lazear et al., 2012). Unfortunately, we do not have data on where individuals eat and if they attempt to avoid 
chain restaurants that post calories on menus and menu boards.   
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sample to be less pronounced than what would be inferred from experimental work that restricts 
attention to calories consumed in a restaurant that posts calories on menus. 
 
VI. Understanding Why Calorie Labels Matter 
The prior section shows evidence consistent with our theoretical prediction that calorie 
labels reduce BMI and calories consumed for the average consumer.  To better ascertain why we 
observe this effect, we return to the predictions of our theoretical model, which suggest two 
channels through which calorie labels could impact choice: they provide information which 
reduces the marginal internality for low information individuals and they may impart 
psychological or moral costs on all decision makers.   
As highlighted in our theory, the key to understanding the relative importance of these 
different channels is to explore the effects of calorie labels on the well-being of low and high 
information types.  Specifically, our theory predicts that the effect for high information types is 
unambiguously negative provided that calorie labels trigger psychological or moral costs.  In 
contrast, the welfare effect on low information types is ambiguous as it depends on the size of the 
reduction in the marginal internality and the psychological costs associated with the calorie nudge.   
These predictions provide a way to establish the existence and importance of moral costs.  
If calorie labels work solely through the information channel, we would expect the average effect 
on life satisfaction to be unambiguously positive as the labels would have no impact on high 
information types and an unambiguously positive impact on low information types by reducing 
the marginal internality.  In contrast, if calorie labels trigger moral or psychological costs, the 
effect for high information types is unambiguously negative while the effect for low information 
types is ambiguous.  Hence, the prediction for the average effect is ambiguous and depends on the 
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relative portion of each type and the relative strength of the competing effects for low information 
types. 
We do not directly observe any individual’s type; however, we can draw upon prior 
literature to infer types of consumers who are more likely to have low levels of information.  In 
particular, the review article of Wehling and Lusher (2017) documents that individuals with BMI 
greater than or equal to 30 (in the obese range) systematically underreport calories consumed in 
meals, while there is no such pattern for individuals in healthy weight ranges.35  We thus use 
observed BMI as a proxy for individuals’ types when exploring the effects of calorie labels on life 
satisfaction. 
To do this, we estimate ordered probit models since life satisfaction is an ordinal outcome 
with responses on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from very dissatisfied to very satisfied.  Since the 
sample period for life satisfaction is much shorter than the period for BMI (2005-2010 rather than 
1994-2012), we omit county-specific time trends in our baseline specification and instead show 
the sensitivity of the results to their inclusion in a robustness check, which we show in Appendix 
B.  The other robustness checks, also in the appendix, are similar to those used for BMI, with the 
only exception being that we do not vary the length of the pre-treatment periods since utilizing a 
lengthy pre-treatment period is not feasible for life satisfaction.  
In the upper panel of Table 5, we document the estimates from ordered probit model for 
each life satisfaction category for the full sample.  Results from this exercise provide evidence that 
the average consumer is worse off following the implementation of the local calorie mandates.36  
 
35 While it may be tempting to use additional demographic characteristics to define types, Wehling and Lusher 
(2017) document that there is no consistent pattern of differences in beliefs across other demographic characteristics 
such as race, age, and gender. 
36 Because the sample ends in 2010 for life satisfaction, which limits the variation across regions in the stringency of 
enforcement, we do not examine the impact of calorie-posting requirements on life satisfaction by the stringency of 
the enforcement of the local laws.   
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For the full sample, the implementation of the laws decrease the probability of being very satisfied 
with one’s life by 2.6 percentage points, which corresponds to 6.3% of the mean.  At the other end, 
calorie-posting requirements increase the probability of reporting being very dissatisfied by 0.2 
percentage points and dissatisfied by 0.6 percentage points.  For perspective, these effects 
correspond to an approximate 17% and 12% increase relative to the means for these categories. 
Further, calorie posting-requirements increase the probability of reporting being satisfied by 1.8 
percentage points, corresponding to an increase of 3% relative to the baseline means.   
Considering the estimates for all categories jointly, these results suggest that, on average, 
individuals are less satisfied with their life following the implementation of calorie mandates, as 
the distribution of life satisfaction shifts to the left.  To better ascertain the magnitude of these 
changes, our estimated effects are equivalent to those estimated for small changes in air pollution 
(Levinson, 2012) or cigarette taxes (Gruber and Mullainathan, 2005).  However, the estimates are 
substantially smaller than the effects of variation in daily traffic congestion in Beijing, China 
(Anderson et al., 2016) or improved housing for low-income households in South America 
(Galiani et al., 2018).  The results are again stable across the various specifications, with the 
estimates from all robustness checks falling within a standard error of the baseline estimate.37 
While the effects for the full sample are suggestive of the presence of moral costs, a sharper 
test of our theoretical predictions is based upon heterogeneity of the effects across high and low 
information types.  The bottom two panels of Table 5 provide results for this exercise, where we 
proxy for information types using weight status.  The estimates for individuals in the healthy 
weight category (high information types) are presented in the second panel and reinforce the notion 
 
37 Given the relatively short length of the pre-treatment period in the life satisfaction regressions, we conduct only 
one falsification test in which the sample period consists of 2005-2007 and the placebo intervention occurs midway 
through this period (July 2006) for all the treated areas. The estimated “effects” of the placebo calorie labeling laws 
on the probabilities of being in each of the life satisfaction states are small and statistically insignificant. 
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that calorie labels impart moral costs.  For example, we find a 6.4 percentage point reduction in 
the likelihood that an individual residing in the treated areas in the post-treatment period reports 
being very satisfied with their life.  Further, we find a 0.4 percentage point increase and a 1.4 
percentage point increase in the likelihood of reporting being very dissatisfied and dissatisfied with 
their life due to calorie-posting requirements.  Estimates for overweight and obese individuals are 
not statistically significant for any life satisfaction category and are uniformly smaller in 
magnitude relative to the corresponding estimates for healthy weight individuals. 
A potential concern is that estimates of the impact of calorie-posting laws conditional on 
current weight status may be biased if treatment impacts weight status.  To assess the plausibility 
of this concern, we estimate ordered probit models analogous to equation (3) to determine whether 
calorie-posting requirements change the probability that an individual is classified as healthy 
weight, overweight, or obese.  We find that the estimates for healthy weight, overweight, and 
obesity are small in magnitude and not statistically significant, as shown in Appendix Table B8.38  
Hence, it does not appear as if our classification of individuals as high or low information types is 
itself a function of exposure to calorie-posting laws. 
Another potential concern with the interpretation of these results is that there may be 
differences in the likelihood that overweight and obese individuals observe calorie counts on 
restaurant menus relative to healthy weight individuals.  If so, our results could reflect differential 
exposure to calorie counts rather than differences in the channels through which calorie labels 
impact choice across these types.  To assess the plausibility of such concern, we return to the 
survey data of restaurant consumers initially discussed in section IV.  As the survey included 
 
38 The weight loss corresponding to the average decrease in BMI shown in Table 3 is 1.5 pounds.  The difference 
between the overweight and obesity thresholds of 5 BMI units corresponds to around 30 pounds at the sample mean 
height.  Thus, it is not surprising that the estimates of the impact of calorie-posting requirements on overweight and 
obesity are small in magnitude and not statistically significant. 
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information on height and weight for the respondent, we are able to examine if there are differences 
across types in the likelihood that consumers reported noticing calorie counts at restaurant meals 
in the previous 24 hours.  The data suggest that there are no such differences; calorie counts were 
noticed by 38.6% of healthy weight individuals, 37.4% of overweight individuals, and 35.4% of 
obese individuals.   
It is thus unlikely that our results reflect endogenous sample selection or differential 
exposure to calorie counts across consumer types.  Rather, our results suggest that both information 
and moral costs are important channels through which calorie labels influence consumer choice 
and, hence, BMI.  For high information types, we observe reductions in life satisfaction, which is 
consistent with the theoretical role of moral costs.  For low information types, we observe no 
change in life satisfaction, suggesting reductions in the marginal internality and a compensating 
increase in moral costs.    
An alternate way to identify the importance of moral costs would be to return to the analysis 
of BMI to consider the effects across the distribution of consumer types using quantile regression.  
Recall that our theoretical model predicts a reduction in BMI across all consumer types, if calorie 
labels trigger moral costs.  The key to testing this prediction is to examine changes in BMI for 
individuals in the healthy weight region of the distribution of BMI prior to calorie labels (high 
information types) for whom reductions in BMI should only be observed if there are moral costs.  
In particular, high information types (i.e., individuals with BMI < 25) are contained within the first 
five quantiles.   
Results from the quantile regressions shown in Table 6 highlight two important patterns.  
First, we observe statistically significant reductions in BMI for high information consumers in 
quantiles 0.2 and 0.3, reinforcing the importance of moral costs identified in our estimates on life 
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satisfaction.  Second, we observe the largest point estimates in the 0.9 quantile, corresponding to 
low information consumers (i.e., obese individuals with BMI ≥ 30).  This suggests that both moral 
costs and information channels are likely influential for such types. 39   Further, these results 
reinforce the interpretation of our findings for life satisfaction on the importance of moral costs as 
a channel through which calorie labels influence choice.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
In an attempt to provide information to consumers at the point of purchase, policymakers 
have introduced laws requiring chain restaurants to post calorie counts on menus.  To date, research 
exploring such laws has focused on identifying their impact on calories consumed and/or BMI.  In 
this paper, we examine a new question – why such laws influence consumer choice.  To do so, we 
develop a theoretical model through which the information on restaurant menus reduces 
internalities and influences choice.  Our model demonstrates another channel through which 
calorie counts influence choice – by increasing moral costs, which leads consumers to decrease 
calories consumed but also reduces welfare for these consumers.  Importantly, we use the model 
to develop testable predictions that allow us to uncover the presence and importance of each 
channel.   
We test these predictions by combining BRFSS data on BMI and life satisfaction with other 
secondary data sources.  Specifically, we explore the impact of city, county, and state calorie 
posting requirements on BMI and life satisfaction by comparing changes in these outcomes over 
time in geographic areas that implemented such requirements to changes in the surrounding 
 
39 We note that the estimate in the 0.9 quantile is not statistically significantly different from zero, nor is this 
estimate significantly different from the estimates at any other quantile.  However, it is important to note that there is 
large variability in BMI in this quantile relative to other quantiles; hence, given our estimated effect size, the power 
of tests in this quantile is low. 
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geographic areas using a difference-in-differences design.  Lending credibility to this design, we 
show that the trends in BMI are similar in these areas prior to the enforcement of any law.  
Moreover, we present evidence from supplemental survey data showing that restaurants in the 
treated areas are more likely to report posting calories on menus and consumers in treated areas 
are more likely to report noticing calories on menus. 
We find that calorie-posting laws lead to small reductions in average BMI and that such 
effects reflect both moral costs and responses to more salient information.  The importance of 
moral costs is identified through two pieces of evidence: weight loss and reductions in life 
satisfaction for individuals in the healthy weight range of BMI (i.e., the high information types in 
our theoretical model).  The importance of information comes from the results that we find 
reductions in BMI but no change in life satisfaction for individuals in the obese category (i.e., the 
low types in our model).   
From a policy perspective, the estimated 0.17 kg/m2 reduction in average BMI, which 
corresponds to a decrease of about 1.5 pounds at the mean height of the sample, is unlikely to 
impact health conditions related to BMI and obesity.  Moreover, our estimated effects are smaller 
than what would be predicted if we were to extrapolate evidence from field experiments exploring 
the impact of calorie labels on the choices of consumers in restaurants.  Yet, insights from the 
literature on scalability helps to reconcile these differences.  Since calorie labels introduce moral 
costs, some consumers may change where they eat to avoid exposure to such labels and restaurants 
may choose to not comply with the law.  Both effects would serve to attenuate the impact of 
calorie-labeling requirements on BMI relative to what would be inferred from field experiments 
that do not allow for sorting or imperfect compliance. 
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Our results are consistent with the notion that “nudges” may be welfare enhancing for some 
individuals but welfare reducing for others.  We are not the first to demonstrate such heterogeneous 
welfare effects for policies motivated by behavioral insights.  Similar welfare effects have been 
explored in the context of the introduction of active choice for health insurance plans (Handel, 
2013) and the receipt of monthly home energy reports (Allcott and Kessler, 2019).  Yet, one should 
not use the possibility that calorie labels may have adverse welfare effects for certain types of 
individuals to rule out the use of such nudges.  Such an approach would be akin to advocating 
doctors forgo prescribing any medication that could have adverse side effects for some individuals.  
Instead, we would ideally understand the benefits and costs of nudges, and tailor them to the 
population that is the most likely to benefit from them.  
Future work should focus on the welfare effects of calorie labels in greater detail.  We 
envision three avenues for such work.  First, we should directly estimate the welfare effects of 
calorie labels on individual well-being.  Second, we should extend the analysis to incorporate 
changes in externalities related to obesity to allow for the estimation of social welfare.  Third, just 
as physicians have thought of ways to mitigate the side effects of certain medicines, we should 
explore ways to mitigate the adverse effects of “nudges” such as calorie labels without 
compromising their overall impact on the targeted behaviors. 
An additional direction for future work is to incorporate adaptation.  The current paper and 
sample frame do not allow us to say anything about adaptation.  Our results should therefore be 
considered as short run estimates that are necessary for testing our theory, which is a static model.  
Further work should extend our theory to allow for dynamics and consider a longer-time horizon 
to allow for adaptation and the derivation of long-run welfare effects. 
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Figure 1 – Average BMI During Sample Period 
 
Note: Observations are aggregated to the county level, with each county weighted by its population. The treatment 
group consists of all localities listed in Table 1, while the control group consists of other counties in MSAs with at 
least one “treated” county, plus New England, excluding any counties/states in these areas that passed but did not 
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Table 1 – Menu Labeling Laws in Localities Prior to the 2014 FDA Final Rule 




on Number of 
Establishments 
New York City (New York, Bronx, 
Queens, Kings, Richmond Counties, NY) December 2006 April 2008 ≥15 
Seattle (King County, WA) August 2007 January 2009 ≥15 
Westchester County, NY (NYC MSA) November 2008 June 2009 ≥15 
Philadelphia City/County, PA December 2008 January 2010 ≥15 
Albany County, NY September 2009 April 2010 ≥15 
Montgomery County, MD (DC MSA) December 2009 July 2010 ≥20 
Schenectady County, NY (Albany MSA) March 2010 October 2010 ≥15 
Suffolk County, NY (NYC MSA) November 2009 November 2010 ≥15 
State of Vermont June 2010 January 2011 ≥20 
 
Notes: New York City, Westchester County, Suffolk County, Philadelphia County, Schenectady County, and 
Montgomery County actively enforced the local mandate from the date of implementation shown in the table through 
the implementation of the federal mandate as part of the ACA in May 2018.  Based on correspondence with local 
officials, King County enforced the mandate between January 2009 and May 2010, Vermont did not actively enforce 
the mandate through inspection but instead reacted to customer complaints about a lack of calories on the menu, and 
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Table 2 – Pre-Treatment Means with Standard Deviations in Parentheses 
Variable Treatment Group Control Group 
Body mass index (BMI=weight in kg/height in m2) 26.093 (5.195) 26.177 (5.098) 
BMI Categories   
Healthy Weight (BMI < 25) 0.466 (0.499) 0.453 (0.498) 
Overweight (25 ≤ BMI < 30 kg/m2) 0.356 (0.479) 0.362 (0.481) 
Class I Obese (30 ≤ BMI < 35 kg/m2) 0.122 (0.328) 0.128 (0.334) 
Class II/III Obese (BMI ≥ 35 kg/m2) 0.055 (0.229) 0.057 (0.231) 
Other Health Behaviors   
Currently smokes cigarettes 0.201 (0.401) 0.208 (0.406) 
Number of drinks (0 if none) in past 30 days 9.496 (18.082) 11.534 (20.485) 
Any exercise (besides regular job) in past month 0.725 (0.447) 0.783 (0.412) 
Minutes per week over the past month of moderate 
exercise (large increases in heart rate/breathing) 
48.793 (66.801) 52.497 (67.213) 
 
Minutes per week over the past month of vigorous 
exercise (small increases in heart rate/breathing) 
30.859 (51.165) 35.113 (53.556) 
Life Satisfaction Categories   
Very dissatisfied 0.013 (0.113) 0.010 (0.009) 
Dissatisfied 0.051 (0.220) 0.036 (0.187) 
Satisfied 0.537 (0.499) 0.478 (0.499) 
Very satisfied 0.400 (0.384) 0.476 (0.499) 
Control Variables   
Race/ethnicity is non-Hispanic black 0.180 (0.384) 0.101 (0.301) 
Ethnicity is Hispanic 0.166 (0.372) 0.054 (0.226) 
Race/ethnicity is neither white, black, nor Hispanic 0.092 (0.289) 0.049 (0.215) 
High school degree but no further 0.268 (0.443) 0.282 (0.450) 
Some college but no 4-year degree 0.242 (0.428) 0.257 (0.437) 
College graduate or higher 0.363 (0.481) 0.381 (0.486) 
Age in years 44.883 (17.357) 45.421 (17.112) 
Gender is female 0.507 (0.500) 0.500 (0.500) 
Married 0.497 (0.500) 0.594 (0.491) 
County population density 19537 (21892) 1520 (1988) 
County median household income 45602 (15335) 55868 (12749) 
County unemployment rate in percent 5.809 (2.116) 4.208 (1.285) 
Sample size in pre-treatment period (1994-2007) 120,755 246,848 
Notes: Sample sizes vary for the other health behavior and life satisfaction outcomes. Observations are weighted 
using the BRFSS sampling weights.  
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Table 3 – Effects of Chain Restaurant Calorie Posting Laws on Body Mass Index 















Sample size 594,364 594,364 
Mean of Outcome 26.711 26.711 
 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by county, are in parentheses. *** indicates 
statistically significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling 
weights. The control group consists of other counties in MSAs with at least one “treated” county, plus New England, 
excluding any counties/states in these areas that passed but did not implement a calorie labeling law. The controls 
include binary indicators for the individual’s sex, age, race/ethnicity, marital status, and education level, as well as 
county-level population density, median income, and unemployment rate. County and month*year fixed effects are 
also included, as well as linear county-specific time trends.  
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Law Implemented but No 























Sample Size 591,432 526,857 545,840 194,705 194,705 
Mean of Outcome 0.192 10.979 0.762 49.600 30.093 
 
Notes: Results shown are average marginal effects from probit models for smoker and any exercise and negative 
binomial models for drinks per month and minutes of exercise per week. (Coefficient estimates from linear models 
are nearly identical.) Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by county, are in parentheses. *** 
indicates statistically significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS 
sampling weights. The control group consists of other counties in MSAs with at least one “treated” county, plus 
New England, excluding any counties/states in these areas that passed but did not implement a calorie labeling law. 
The controls include dummies for the individual’s sex, age, race/ethnicity, marital status, and education level, as 
well as county-level population density, median income, and unemployment rate. County and month*year fixed 
effects are also included, as well as linear county-specific time trends.  
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Table 5 – Effects of Chain Restaurant Calorie Posting Laws on Probabilities of Life 
Satisfaction States 
 P(Very 
Dissatisfied) P(Dissatisfied) P(Satisfied) 
P(Very 
Satisfied) 





















Mean of Outcome 0.0121 0.0496 0.5256 0.4127 
     





















Mean of Outcome 0.0085 0.0434 0.5145 0.4336 
 





















Mean of Outcome 0.0145 0.0538 0.5331 0.3986 
 
Notes: Average marginal effects from ordered probit regressions are shown. Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-
robust and clustered by county, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 
10% level. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights. The control group consists of other 
counties in MSAs with at least one “treated” county, excluding any counties/states in these areas that passed but did 
not implement a calorie labeling law. The controls include dummies for the individual’s sex, age, race/ethnicity, 
marital status, and education level, as well as county-level population density, median income, and unemployment 
rate. County and month*year fixed effects are also included. 
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Table 6 – Quantile Regression Results 
 Quantile 
 
Healthy Weight Overweight Obese 
 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 



























































          
BMI at Quantile 20.80 22.35 23.54 24.61 25.80 27.02 28.40 30.36 33.55 
 
Notes: Sample size is 593,364. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% 
level. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights. The control group consists of other counties in MSAs with at least one “treated” county, 
plus New England, excluding any counties/states in these areas that passed but did not implement a calorie labeling law. The controls include dummies for the 
individual’s sex, age, race/ethnicity, marital status, and education level, as well as county-level population density, median income, and unemployment rate. Area 
(e.g. untreated portion of NYC metro area) and quarter*year fixed effects are also included, as well as linear area-specific time trends.  
 











 55  
APPENDIX A – Theoretical Appendix 
In this Appendix we compute social welfare and provide a specific interpretation of the 
model.  First, in order to compute social welfare, we need to take into account the relative weights 
of both groups. Let the weights be 𝜇𝜇𝐿𝐿  and 𝜇𝜇𝐻𝐻  that we assign to both groups respectively, and recall 
that ∆𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 = 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖1|𝑒𝑒1) − 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖0|𝑒𝑒0). Then, the change in social welfare is given by: 
∆𝑊𝑊 = 𝜇𝜇𝐿𝐿 ∗ ∆𝑊𝑊𝐿𝐿 + 𝜇𝜇𝐻𝐻 ∗ 𝛥𝛥𝑊𝑊𝐻𝐻 . 
 
Corollary 1A. A sufficient condition for the nudge to increase welfare for society is 
𝜇𝜇𝐿𝐿[𝛬𝛬𝐿𝐿(𝑒𝑒1) − 𝛬𝛬𝐿𝐿(𝑒𝑒1)] ≥ 𝜇𝜇𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿(𝑒𝑒1) + 𝜇𝜇𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻(𝑒𝑒1). (1A) 
A sufficient condition for the nudge to decrease welfare for society is 
𝜇𝜇𝐿𝐿𝑐𝑐𝐿𝐿(𝑒𝑒1) + 𝜇𝜇𝐻𝐻𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻(𝑒𝑒1) ≥ 𝜇𝜇𝐿𝐿[𝛬𝛬𝐿𝐿(𝑒𝑒0) − 𝛬𝛬𝐿𝐿(𝑒𝑒0)]. (2A) 
 
Observe that in Equation (1A), the left-hand side represents the benefit of the nudge, which 
is the reduction in the internality for the L types, and the right-hand side represents the cost of the 
nudge, which is the sum of moral costs for both groups in society.  A sufficient condition for the 
nudge to increase welfare is therefore that the reduction in the internality has to be sufficiently 
large, as to compensate for the moral costs that are being imposed to all individuals. 
We turn now to one possible interpretation of the model, to make things more specific by 
analyzing a scenario with the possibility of learning.  Suppose the internality arises because 
individuals have different expectations about how much they will enjoy consumption: there is a 
set of states of the world 𝑆𝑆, and experienced utility depends on the environment and the state 
𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒, 𝑠𝑠).  An individual has beliefs 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠) over the states of the of world, and their decision 
utility is their expectation of their experienced utility:  
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𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒) =  𝐸𝐸[𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒, 𝑠𝑠)] = ∫ 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒, 𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖(𝑠𝑠)𝑆𝑆 .   
Therefore, the internality in environment 𝑒𝑒 and state 𝑠𝑠 is  
𝛬𝛬𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒, 𝑠𝑠) =  𝐸𝐸[𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒, 𝑠𝑠)] − 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒, 𝑠𝑠).   
If individuals in 𝐻𝐻  have accurate beliefs (they know 𝑠𝑠 ), then they are unbiased, because 
𝐸𝐸[𝑢𝑢ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒, 𝑠𝑠)] = 𝑢𝑢ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒, 𝑠𝑠).  Individuals in 𝐿𝐿 have inaccurate beliefs: they believe that they 
will enjoy calories more than they actually do, i.e., 𝐸𝐸[𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒, 𝑠𝑠)] >  𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒, 𝑠𝑠), so they are 
biased towards overconsumption, since  𝛬𝛬𝑙𝑙(𝑥𝑥|𝑒𝑒, 𝑠𝑠) > 0.  Suppose that individuals update their 
beliefs when they receive the nudge. Individuals in 𝐻𝐻 already had accurate beliefs, and hence do 
not learn from the nudge; however, they suffer the psychological cost, and are therefore worse off 
because of the nudge. Individuals in 𝐿𝐿 update their beliefs, which are now more accurate, and they 
will be better off whenever the increased utility from making a better choice is larger than the 
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APPENDIX B – Sample Composition and Robustness Checks 
Table B1 in this appendix provides detail on the composition of our sample by county. The 
rest of the appendix conducts robustness, placebo, and event-study analyses to evaluate the validity 
of our baseline estimates, shown in Tables 3 and 5, of the influence of local calorie mandates on 
BMI and life satisfaction.  Overall, these robustness checks suggest that the conclusions are robust 
to concerns about policy endogeneity, construction of the control group sample, the staggered 
implementation of the laws, and the limited number of policy changes. 
Table B2 reports the results from robustness checks for BMI. We first include only basic 
demographic controls – age, gender, and race/ethnicity – along with the county and time fixed 
effects and county-specific time trends. The other controls are potentially endogenous and 
endogeneity bias could plausibly spill over to the coefficient of interest. The second robustness 
check drops county-specific time trends to increase the amount of identifying variation. Third and 
fourth, we restrict the sample period to 2001-2012 and 2005-2012 in order to test the sensitivity of 
the results to the length of the pre-treatment period.  The similarity of the results to different sample 
periods suggests that the overall estimate is not driven by different weighting of the sample 
(Goodman-Bacon, 2018). Fifth and sixth, we use these same shorter sample periods but drop the 
county trends. The seventh robustness check excludes counties adjacent to treated counties due to 
some of their residents likely working or visiting – and therefore eating some restaurant meals – 
in the treated county. If this is a major concern, then excluding those with the closest proximity to 
the treated county should affect the estimates. In any case, to the extent that such cross-county 
spillovers occur, this would likely mean our baseline results are conservative. The eighth check 
clusters standard errors by state rather than county, while addressing possible concerns about the 
small number of clusters by following Cameron and Miller’s (2015) recommendation and 
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conducting inference using the t-distribution rather than standard normal.  The ninth check clusters 
standard errors at the treated unit (e.g., New York City) rather than county and similarly follows 
the recommendations of Cameron and Miller (2015).  The robustness of the inference to these 
different clustering approaches suggest that the conclusions are robust to concerns about the 
limited number of policy changes. 
The last two robustness checks in Table B2 focus on the choice of control units. First, as 
an alternate control group, we simply use the top 10% of the population density distribution from 
the entire BRFSS sample. This strategy is based on the fact that the most glaring pre-treatment 
difference between the proximity-based treatment and control groups is that the individuals in the 
treatment group lived in much more densely populated counties. Note again that, since this control 
group is not based on geographic proximity to a treated county, this strategy is immune to the 
concern about cross-county restaurant eating.  
Finally, we employ the synthetic control method of Abadie et al. (2010) to allow the data 
to choose a weighted combination of control counties that best matches the pre-treatment 
characteristics of the treatment group. The synthetic control method was originally designed for 
aggregate data; we follow the procedure used by Fitzpatrick (2008) and Courtemanche and Zapata 
(2014) to apply the method to individual data. We begin by aggregating the data to the county-by-
year level, further combining all the treated counties together into a single cross-sectional unit. 
Our “donor pool” consists of all counties in the original proximity-based control group as well as 
all those in the top 10% of the population density distribution. The synthetic control procedure 
computes the weights for each county in the donor pool that yields the best possible match to the 
treatment group along dimensions chosen by the researcher. In the results shown, we match based 
on means of the control variables in the pre-treatment period as well as BMI in four pre-treatment 
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years: 1994, 1998, 2003, and 2007.40 We then return to the individual-level data and re-run the 
regressions using as weights for the control group the product of the BRFSS individual sampling 
weight and the county’s synthetic weight.  The robustness of the estimates in these last two 
specifications suggest that the conclusions are robust to concerns about the construction of the 
control group sample. 
As shown in Table B2, the results are quite robust across these different specifications. The 
effect of calorie labeling laws on BMI is always statistically significant at the 10% level or less, 
with magnitudes ranging from -0.147 to -0.253 units.    
Table B3 turns to placebo tests using just the pre-treatment portion of the sample period 
(1994-2007). In difference-in-difference designs, identification hinges on the assumption that there 
is a common counterfactual trend in the dependent variable between the treated and the control 
groups. We can test whether this assumption is likely to be valid by running placebo tests to 
evaluate whether calorie posting laws have “effects” in periods of time other than those during 
which they are implemented (“false” treatments). To implement these tests, we pre-date the laws 
to occur over each possible 4-year range during the pre-treatment period and re-estimate the 
baseline model for each outcome. As the results show, we find no evidence for differential 
counterfactual trends in the pre-treatment period. The estimates are all small and insignificant. 
Table B4 considers a different method to test for problematic pre-treatment trends: event- 
study regression. Rather than including a single indicator for whether a calorie labeling law has 
been enacted, we include a series of indicators reflecting time until implementation. Specifically, 
in addition to the usual “law enacted” dummy variable, we also include dummy variables for 
 
40 The resulting synthetic control group is 19.2% Denver, CO; 0.1% Pinellas, FL; 39.4% Cook, IL; 4.8% Baltimore, 
MD; 0.8% Arlington, VA; 12.4% Fairfax, VA; 18.3% Norfolk, VA; 5.1% Roanoke, VA. We have also considered 
numerous other combinations of matching variables and the results are similar. 
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whether the law has not yet been enacted in that particular county but will be in the next 25-48 
months, 49-72 months, 73-96 months, 97-120 months, and more than 120 months. The reference 
period is therefore the omitted “next 1-24 months” category. Since Wolfers (2006) makes a 
compelling case that including treatment-unit-specific time trends is inappropriate in this type of 
dynamic specification, we exclude the county trends from the event study model. As the table 
shows, there is no evidence that any “effects” emerge in the years leading up to the law’s 
implementation. Moreover, the estimates for the “true” treatment effect remain virtually identical 
to those from the analogous specification (the one without county trends) in Table B2.41  The 
results from the event-study design and the similarity in the estimates between the event-study 
design and difference-in-differences specification suggests that the treatment effect estimates from 
the difference-in-differences specification with staggered implementation of the laws are unlikely 
to be biased (Goodman-Bacon, 2018). Thus, the placebo tests and the event-study design suggest 
that the conclusions are robust to concerns about policy endogeneity and the staggered 
implementation of the laws. 
Table B5 displays the estimates of the influence of omitting each calorie-posting law from 
each city, county, and state, one at a time, from the sample.  Given the concern that difference-in-
differences specifications with staggered implementation of the laws are a weighted average of all 
the treatment-control comparisons (Goodman-Bacon, 2018), such an approach determines whether 
one treated or control area has a disproportionately large weight in the estimation of the overall 
treatment effect.  As shown in the table, the estimate is similar across all 16 specifications, which 
suggests that the impact is not driven by one law or one control group.   In two cases, the estimate 
 
41 We also considered an even more flexible event study model with separate indicators for each year. While this 
model also revealed no evidence of problematic pre-trends, many of the estimates became quite imprecise, so the 
results were not particularly informative. 
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is not statistically significant; however, the estimate in every specification is always within one 
standard error of the baseline estimate.  Thus, this table reinforces the conclusion from the event-
study design and the synthetic control approach, which use different weights than the baseline 
specification, that the results are robust to concerns about the staggered implementation of the 
laws.  
The top panel of Table B6 shows the robustness of the estimate of the influence of calorie 
mandates on life satisfaction. The robustness checks are similar to those used for BMI, except that, 
since life satisfaction is only available starting in 2005, we do not vary the length of the pre-
treatment period. The results remain qualitatively similar across the various specifications, as all 
estimates have the same sign and are statistically significant at the 10% level or less. The 
magnitudes are somewhat sensitive to specification (e.g., calorie labeling laws reduce the 
probability of being very satisfied by between 1.7 and 3.0 percentage points), but all estimates are 
within each other’s 95% confidence intervals.  
The bottom two panels of Table B6 evaluate pre-treatment trends in life satisfaction. Given 
the relatively short length of the pre-treatment period in the life satisfaction regressions, we 
conduct only one placebo test in which the sample period consists of 2005-2007 and the placebo 
intervention occurs midway through this period (July 2006) for all the treated areas.42  Similarly, 
the event-study model only includes two treatment indicators: whether the law is law currently 
enacted and whether it will be enacted in more than 24 months, with future enactment of 1-23 
months as the reference category.  In both the placebo and event study regressions, we find no 
evidence of problematic pre-trends, as the “effects” of the pre-dated law are very small and 
statistically insignificant.  
 
42 We exclude county time trends from the placebo regression since it only uses three years of data. 
 62  
Table B7 shows the robustness of the results for life satisfaction to excluding observations 
in each treated and control unit one at a time.  Similar to this approach for BMI, this analysis shows 
that the results for life satisfaction are robust to concerns due to the staggered implementation of 
these laws.  
Table B8 shows the estimates of calorie-posting laws on weight status.  The table shows 
average marginal effects from an ordered probit regression.  The weight status categories are: 
healthy weight (BMI < 25), overweight but not obese (25 ≤ BMI < 30), Class I obese (30 ≤ BMI 
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APPENDIX TABLES 
Table B1 – Composition of the Sample by County 
Treatment Group  Control Group 
County Observations  County Observations 
New York City MSA 
Bronx, NY 3,847  Dutchess, NY 1,508 
Kings, NY 7,524  Essex, NY 270 
New York, NY 7,827  Orange, NY 1,579 
Queens, NY 6,942  Putnam, NY 425 
Richmond, NY 1,682  Rockland, NY 1,229 
Suffolk, NY 6,199  Sullivan, NY 394 
Westchester, NY 4,076  Pike, PA 2,096 
     
Philadelphia MSA 
Philadelphia, PA 15,291  New Castle, DE 24,701 
   Cecil, MD 3,305 
   Bucks, PA 3,982 
   Chester, PA 3,944 
   Delaware, PA 3,670 
   Montgomery, PA 5,396 
     
Seattle MSA 
King, WA 40,565  Pierce, WA 17,487 
   Snohomish, WA 17,340 
     
Washington, DC MSA 
Montgomery, MD 14,370  Washington, DC 43,490 
   Calvert, MD 2,907 
   Charles, MD 4,116 
   Frederick, MS 7,169 
   Anne Arundel, MD 10,626 
   Arlington, VA 2,118 
   Clarke, VA 105 
   Culpeper, VA 410 
   Fairfax, VA 3,166 
   Fauquier, VA 685 
   Loudoun, VA 1,915 
   Prince William, VA 2,170 
   Rappahannock, VA 48 
   Spotsylvania, VA 798 
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   Stafford, VA 757 
   Warren, VA 285 
   Alexandria City, VA 1,881 
   Fairfax City, VA 274 
   Falls Church City, VA 53 
   Fredericksburg City, VA 165 
   Manassas City, VA 147 
   Manassas Park City, VA 23 
   Jefferson, WV 1,333 
     
Albany MSA 
Albany, NY 1,855  Rensselaer, NY 950 
Schenectady, NY 884  Saratoga, NY 1,287 
     
New England 
Addison, VT 5,096  Fairfield, CT 22,448 
Bennington, VT 5,032  Hartford, CT 20,724 
Caledonia, VT 4,273  Litchfield, CT 4,573 
Chittenden, VT 17,513  Middlesex, CT 4,284 
Essex, VT 493  New Haven, CT 20,410 
Franklin, VT 5,777  New London, CT 6,795 
Grand Isle, VT 462  Tolland, CT 4,303 
Lamoille, VT 3,254  Windham, CT 4,400 
Orange, VT 4,370  Belknap, NH 4,294 
Orleans, VT 3,819  Carroll, NH 3,711 
Rutland, VT 8,480  Cheshire, NH 5,277 
Washington, VT 8,297  Coos, NH 3,609 
Windham, VT 6,543  Grafton, NH 5,871 
Windsor, VT 8,144  Hillsborough, NH 17,840 
   Merrimack, NH 7,643 
   Rockingham, NH 13,033 
   Strafford, NH 6,775 
   Sullivan, NH 3,508 
   Bristol, RI 3,163 
   Kent, RI 10,110 
   Newport, RI 5,583 
   Providence, RI 40,980 
   Washington, RI 8,211 
     
Total 
26 counties 192,615  63 counties 401,749 
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Table B2 – Robustness Checks for Body Mass Index 
 BMI 




Robustness checks  
Basic demographic controls only (n=593,364) -0.186* 
(0.095) 






2005-2012 (n=357,514) -0.150** 
(0.075) 
2001-2012; drop county trends (n=475,842) -0.171** 
(0.080) 
2005-2012; drop county trends (n=357,514) -0.193** 
(0.075) 
Exclude adjacent counties (n=478,867) -0.211*** 
(0.076) 
Cluster by state (n=593,364) -0.174** 
(0.073) 
Cluster by treated unit (n=593,364) -0.174** 
(0.072) 
Control group is pop. density > 2,000/sq. mi. (n=458,519) -0.157* 
(0.088) 
Synthetic control group (n=254,050) -0.192** 
(0.094) 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by county, are in parentheses. *** indicates 
statistically significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling 
weights. Unless otherwise indicated, the control group consists of other counties in MSAs with at least one “treated” 
county, plus New England. Unless otherwise indicated, the controls include dummies for the individual’s sex, age, 
race/ethnicity, marital status, and education level; county-level population density, median income, and 
unemployment rate; county and month*year fixed effects; and county-specific linear time trends.  
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Table B3 – Placebo Tests for Body Mass Index using Pre-Treatment Data (1994-2007) 
 BMI 




































Laws start 4/1995-1/1998 0.001 
(0.079) 
Notes: n=367,603. Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by county, are in parentheses. *** 
indicates statistically significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS 
sampling weights. Unless otherwise indicated, the control group consists of other counties in MSAs with at least one 
“treated” county, plus New England. Unless otherwise indicated, the controls include dummies for the individual’s 
sex, age, race/ethnicity, marital status, and education level; county-level population density, median income, and 
unemployment rate; county and month*year fixed effects; and county-specific linear time trends.  
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Law will be enacted in 25-48 months -0.071 
(0.092) 
Law will be enacted in 49-72 months -0.040 
(0.095) 
Law will be enacted in 73-96 months 0.045 
(0.116) 
Law will be enacted in 97-120 months -0.031 
(0.119) 
Law will be enacted in more than 120 months 0.081 
(0.087) 
Notes: n=593,364. Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by county, are in parentheses. *** 
indicates statistically significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS 
sampling weights. Unless otherwise indicated, the control group consists of other counties in MSAs with at least one 
“treated” county, plus New England. Unless otherwise indicated, the controls include dummies for the individual’s 
sex, age, race/ethnicity, marital status, and education level; county-level population density, median income, and 
unemployment rate; and county and month*year fixed effects.  
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Table B5 –Effects of Chain Restaurant Calorie Posting Laws on Body Mass Index Leaving 
Out One Area at a Time 
Area Dropped Sample Size Estimate 
None (Baseline Estimate) 594,364 -0.174 (0.081)** 
New York City 566,542 -0.120 (0.094) 
Montgomery County 579,994 -0.185 (0.084)** 
Albany County 592,509 -0.174 (0.082)** 
Schenectady County 593,480 -0.181 (0.081)** 
Suffolk County 588,165 -0.132 (0.078)* 
Westchester County 590,288 -0.176 (0.085)** 
Philadelphia County 579,073 -0.189 (0.086)** 
Vermont 512,811 -0.192 (0.084)** 
King County 553,799 -0.202 (0.087)** 
Untreated parts of New York City MSA 586,863 -0.179 (0.081)** 
Untreated parts of Washington, DC MSA 509,723 -0.200 (0.082)** 
Untreated parts of Albany MSA 592,127 -0.177 (0.082)** 
Untreated parts of Philadelphia MSA 549,366 -0.158 (0.076)** 
Untreated parts of New England 366,819 -0.117 (0.089) 
Untreated parts of Seattle MSA 559,537 -0.189 (0.081)** 
Notes: Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by county, are in parentheses. *** indicates 
statistically significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling 
weights. The control group consists of other counties in MSAs with at least one “treated” county, plus New England, 
excluding any counties/states in these areas that passed but did not implement a calorie labeling law. The controls 
include binary indicators for the individual’s sex, age, race/ethnicity, marital status, and education level, as well as 
county-level population density, median income, and unemployment rate. County and month*year fixed effects are 
also included, as well as linear county-specific time trends. 
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Table B6 – Robustness, Placebo, and Event-Study Results for Life Satisfaction 
 P(Very 
Dissatisfied) 
P(Dissatisfied) P(Satisfied) P(Very 
Satisfied) 










Robustness Checks     








































Control group is pop. density > 

















Falsification Test using Pre-Treatment Data (2005-2007) 































Notes: The columns give estimated average effects from an ordered probit regression. Standard errors, 
heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by county, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistically significant at 1% 
level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights. Unless otherwise 
indicated, the control group consists of other counties in MSAs with at least one “treated” county by 2010. Unless 
otherwise indicated, the controls include dummies for the individual’s sex, age, race/ethnicity, marital status, and 
education level; county-level population density, median income, and unemployment rate; and county and 
month*year fixed effects. The first, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth rows under “robustness checks” also include 
county-specific linear time trends. 
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Dissatisfied) P(Dissatisfied) P(Satisfied) P(Very Satisfied) 
None (Baseline Estimate) 82,203 0.002 (0.001)*** 0.007 (0.003)*** 0.021 (0.008)*** -0.030 (0.011)*** 
New York City  71,677 0.002 (0.001)** 0.007 (0.003)** 0.024 (0.012)** -0.033 (0.017)** 
Albany County  81,394 0.003 (0.001)*** 0.008 (0.003)*** 0.022 (0.008)*** -0.032 (0.011)*** 
Schenectady County  81,798 0.002 (0.001)** 0.007 (0.003)** 0.020 (0.008)** -0.029 (0.011)** 
Suffolk County  79,636 0.002 (0.001)** 0.007 (0.003)** 0.021 (0.010)** -0.031 (0.014)** 
Westchester County  80,549 0.002 (0.001)** 0.005 (0.002)** 0.015 (0.007)** -0.022 (0.010)** 
Philadelphia County  74,451 0.002 (0.001)** 0.006 (0.003)** 0.019 (0.009)** -0.028 (0.013)** 
King County  61,946 0.003 (0.001)*** 0.008 (0.002)*** 0.024 (0.007)*** -0.035 (0.010)*** 
Untreated parts of NYC MSA 79,735 0.003 (0.001)*** 0.007 (0.003)*** 0.022 (0.008)*** -0.032 (0.012)*** 
Untreated parts of Albany MSA  81,143 0.002 (0.001)** 0.007 (0.003)** 0.020 (0.008)** -0.029 (0.011)** 
Untreated parts of Philadelphia MSA 67,027 0.003 (0.001)*** 0.008 (0.003)*** 0.021 (0.008)*** -0.031 (0.011)*** 
Untreated parts of Seattle MSA  62,674 0.002 (0.001)** 0.007 (0.003)** 0.020 (0.009)** -0.029 (0.012)** 
Notes: The columns give estimated average effects from an ordered probit regression. *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. 
Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling weights. The control group consists of other counties in MSAs with at least one “treated” county by 2010. 
The controls include binary indicators for the individual’s sex, age, race/ethnicity, marital status, and education level, as well as county-level population density, 
median income, and unemployment rate. County and month*year fixed effects are also included. 
 
 
 72  











Single Treatment Variable 








     
Test for Anticipatory Effects and Weakened Effects from Lack of Active Enforcement  
























Mean of Outcome 0.442 0.360 0.134 0.064 
Notes: Sample size is 594,364. The columns give estimated average marginal effects from an ordered probit 
regression. Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by county, are in parentheses. *** indicates 
statistically significant at 1% level, ** 5% level, * 10% level. Observations are weighted using the BRFSS sampling 
weights. The control group consists of other counties in MSAs with at least one “treated” county, plus New England, 
excluding any counties/states in these areas that passed but did not implement a calorie labeling law. The controls 
include dummies for the individual’s sex, age, race/ethnicity, marital status, and education level, as well as county-
level population density, median income, and unemployment rate. County and month*year fixed effects are also 
included, as well as linear county-specific time trends. 
